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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.
Whether the district court erred as a matter of law by concluding that
there was no basis for an award of attorneys' fees under the Private
Attorney General Doctrine unless: (a) Plaintiffs successful advocacy of the
constitutional and statutory rights of the majority of Davis County voters
who approved public water fluoridation results in a monetary benefit and
creates a common fund out of which fees can be paid; and (b) the actions of
county officers are undertaken in bad faith.
In Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759, 783 (Utah 1994),
the Court made the Private Attorney General Doctrine applicable in Utah "when the
'vindication of a strong or societally important public policy' takes place and the
necessary costs in doing so 'transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an
extent requiring subsidization,'" (citing Serrano v. Priest 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal.
1977)). On appeal, "the appropriate standard for reviewing equitable awards of attorney
fees is abuse of discretion." Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, Tf20. However, the district
court erred as a matter of law by grafting two fee award requirements onto the Stewart
decision which are contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's enunciation of the doctrine: (1)
conferral of a monetary benefit and creation of a common fund from which attorneys'
fees can be paid; and (2) bias on the part of public officers. Because this Court reviews
questions of law under a correction of error standard, the trial court's determination of the
legal standards to be applied should be reviewed without deference. Wilson Supply, Inc.

l

v. Fraden Mfg. Corp., 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002). Nor is this Court bound by the district
court's characterization of its conclusions of law as "findings of fact," and they are
reviewed for correctness. Gilmore v. Wright 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993).
2.
Whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in denying Plaintiffs
attorneys' fees under the Private Attorney General Doctrine by concluding that the
case was "unique but not extraordinary," in disregard for its own conclusions of
law that: (a) the issues presented by Plaintiff are of great importance to the general
public; (b) the lawsuit raised important and unique issues concerning the right of
the people to legislate directly; (c) to allow [the unlawful initiative] petition to be
placed on the ballot would effectively render the referenda provisions of the Utah
Constitution and the Utah Code meaningless; (d) allowing the [unlawful initiative]
petition on the ballot would permit the sponsors to misuse the peoples' direct
legislative power to thwart the will of the majority of Davis County voters; and (e)
Davis County voters have a real and substantial interest in ensuring that the laws
of initiative and referenda are scrupulously followed and the election process
adheres to the rule of law.
Each of these conclusions of law was found and recited by the district court in its
Ruling issued October 15, 2002, and they were incorporated by reference in the Order
filed on October 3, 2003. Each reference underscores the public importance of the result
achieved by the Plaintiff in its successful vindication of the rights of the majority, indeed
all, of Davis County voters. Collectively, they describe the Plaintiffs victory as the very
kind of "vindication of strong or societally important public policy" at the core of the
Stewart decision regarding the Public Attorney General Doctrine. The district court's
"finding of fact" that the case was "unique" but not "extraordinary" (and therefore
outside the context of the Public Attorney General Doctrine) is a conclusion of law, and
is a distinction without a difference. A finding that the case was "unique" is tantamount
to a finding that it was "extraordinary." This Court reviews questions of law under a
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correction of error standard, and the trial court's determination of the legal standards to
be applied should be reviewed without deference. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraden Mfg.
Corp., 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002). Nor is this Court bound by the district court's
characterization of its conclusions of law as "findings of fact," and they are reviewed for
correctness. Gilmore v. Wright 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993).
3.
Whether the district court erred in finding no evidence of bad faith, bias, or
abdication of duties despite a pattern of unlawful and improper official actions by
county officers over the course of two years in support of their personal oppositioi
to fluoridation, culminating in their placement on the ballot of an unconstitutiona
and illegal revote petition, and thereby effectively depriving all Davis Counts
voters of due process and therightto impartial decisions regarding ballot integrity.
The Stewart standards do not require a finding of bad faith, bias, or abdication o
duty. Even so, Plaintiff presented evidence of bias, which consisted of the officia
records of the County Commission (and the absence thereof), documents prepared by th(
Clerk, and the unrefuted admissions of the County officers who testified at the August 7
2003 evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees. In making it:
findings of fact regarding lack of official bias, the district court mechanically adopted th(
blanket findings prepared by the Defendant, with no reference to any of the specify
testimony and exhibits before the court, even though Plaintiff timely submitted ai
alternative and specific set of proposed findings. There is nothing to explain why thi
court gave no consideration to the evidentiary issues raised by the Plaintiff in its propose*
alternate findings before issuing its Order. See Bover Company v. Lignell 567 P.2<
1112 (Utah 1977). Normally, the trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed wher
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they are based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence. See 50 West Broadway v.
Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989). However, "A trial court's findings
cannot be made up out of whole cloth; substantial, competent evidence must exist which
supports the findings, and when a finding of fact is not so supported, it must be rejected."
Id., citations omitted.
Whether particular conduct constitutes bad faith, bias, or abdication of duties is a
mixed question of law and fact.

On appeal, "Mixed questions of law and fact are

reviewed for abuse in discretion in applying the law to the facts." Bishop v. Gentec, 48
P.3d 218 (Utah 2002), citations omitted. "With respect to mixed questions of fact and
law, we will review the underlying facts under the deferential clear error standard;
however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the appellate court, and
'no deference need be given a [lower] court's resolution of such questions of law.'"
Mackay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998), citations omitted.

The district court's

findings exceed the limits of reasonability.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Where all of the taxpayer-funded resources of a county are arrayed to promote and
defend an unconstitutional and unlawful initiative to overturn a vote of the people, does
the Private Attorney General Doctrine justify an award of attorneys' fees to a plaintiff

who successfully vindicates the people's constitutional and statutory rights to have the
laws of initiative and referenda scrupulously enforced?
In the general election of 2000, a majority of Davis County voters enacted water
fluoridation as the law of the County. On August 6, 2002, following extended discussion
of a self-styled "initiative petition," the County Commission, without allowing opposing
comment, allowed the unconstitutional and unlawful petition to go on the ballot by
default. On August 15, 2002, Plaintiff Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. filed
an action seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction barring the County Clerk from
placing the unlawful petition on the ballot.
Following a hearing on September 13, 2002, the district court issued a verbal order
granting the injunction sought by Plaintiff, which was formalized in a Ruling issued by
the court on October 15, 2002. In that Ruling, the court decided in Plaintiffs favor on all
causes of action, granted a permanent injunction, and reserved the question of Plaintiffs
attorneys' fees for later consideration and disposition.
Plaintiff filed its Motion for Attorneys' Fees on October 30, 2002, requesting an
award of fees in the amount of $45,034.15, citing the applicability of the Private Attorney
General Doctrine enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart v. Utah Public
Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759,783 (Utah 1994). The Defendants did not dispute the
reasonableness of the fees sought, but opposed the Motion, asserting that Stewart should
not be applied to this case because no common fund had been created and any award of
fees would be punitive in nature against the Defendants. An evidentiary hearing was held
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on August 7, 2003 on the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, and the following day, the court
explained its reasons for denying the Motion in a telephone conference with counsel.
In response to the court's request, counsel for the Defendants drafted an order
incorporating all of the findings and conclusions of the October 15, 2002 Ruling. The
Defendants' draft order was submitted to the Plaintiff, and Plaintiff timely submitted an
alternate draft to the court and counsel which Plaintiff believed more accurately reflected
the state of the evidence adduced at the August 7th hearing. Without further conference
discussion between the court and counsel, (that was itself unusual given the number of
such conferences preceding the October 15, 2002 Ruling), the court issued its final Order
on October 3, 2003 (the Defendants' draft). On October 31, 2003, Plaintiff Utahns for
Better Dental Health-Davis filed its Notice of Appeal:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc., is a Utah nonprofit
corporation organized specifically to advocate the benefits of fluoridation in Davis
County. Many members of the Davis County Board of Health (including five Chairs) and
other concerned Davis County citizens, from 1998 through the end of 2000, were
instrumental in forming and directing the activities of Plaintiff. Plaintiff was significantly
involved in obtaining the legislative changes which enabled the County Commission to
place the fluoridation question on the 2000 ballot, and Plaintiff was significantly involved
in the 2000 county-wide vote on fluoridation. (R. at 279.)

In the general election held on November 7, 2000, the voters of Davis County
approved the addition of fluoride to the public water supplies by a vote of 44,403 in favor
to 40,950 opposed. Of the 85,353 voters who responded to that ballot question, 52%
favoredfluoridation;48% opposed fluoridation. (R. at 277.)
As mandated by the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111(2), on April 5,
2001, the Davis County Health Department issued its order to operators of public water
systems that such operators add fluoride to those systems on or before May 1, 2002. As
of August 15, 2002, when Plaintiff filed its action, approximately 25% of the water
systems in Davis County were fluoridated. (R. at 277.) l
On May 1, 2001, even prior to receipt of an application to circulate a petition, the
County Clerk, Mr. Steve Rawlings, sent an e-mail message (R. at 806, EX 9) to Mr.
David Hansen, who was a principal sponsor of a petition seeking a revote, committing
that the petition would be placed on the 2002 ballot if the sponsors submitted the
necessary number of signatures prior to the filing deadline.
On May 8, 2001, having already been assured by the Clerk that their revote
petition would go on the 2002 ballot if they filed the signatures on time, the petition
sponsors filed their application with the Clerk to circulate their "initiative petition,"
which they titled "Revote on Mandatory Fluoridation Acf requesting: (a) a "Repeal of
prior action;" (b) that a re-vote onfluoridationbe held: and (c) that county voters again

1

Parenthetically, as of January 31, 2004, all 18 public water systems in Davis County
were in compliance with the Health Department's April 5, 2001 order. Implementation of
the 2000 voter mandate has taken three years.
7

be asked the question (in language identical to the 2000 ballot question), "Shouldfluoride
be added to the public water supplies within Davis County?" (R. at 806, EX 10.)
In May 2001, when the Clerk approved the revote petition for circulation, he had
made no analysis of its legality.
One year later, at the County Republican Convention in May 2002, the Clerk
(Steve Rawlings) and other County elected officials signed the revote petition, including
Commission Chairman Dannie McConkie and County Attorney Mel Wilson. (R. at 87465; R. at 768.)
The sponsors of the revote petition filed their completed signature sheets with the
Clerk on or before July 8, 2002. (R. at 874-69.)
Without making any analysis of legality, on July 9, 2002, the Clerk certified the
unvetted petition as an Initiative Petition, and by letter (R. at 806, EX 12) delivered it to
the County Commission.
The Clerk knew when he sent the petition to the Commission that if the
Commission rejected the petition or took no action on it, it would go on the ballot. (R. at
874-106.) By doing so, the Clerk positioned the unlawful petition so that its sponsors,
who wanted to overturn the vote of the people, would not have to pay any of the costs
when its legality was contested.
On August 6, 2002, the County Commission formally took up the matter of the
petition. It was allowed to go on the ballot by default, and the Commission refused to
allow any opposing comment. (R. 806, EX 1; R. at 874-156.)
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On August 15, 2002, Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the petition was
unconstitutional and unlawful, and asked the court to enjoin the petition's placement on
the ballot. (R. at 1.)
On September 16, 2002, the district court ruled in Plaintiffs favor, and enjoined
the County officers from placing the petition on the ballot. (R. at 148.)
On October 15, 2002, the district court issued its formal Ruling. The court held
that the "revote petition" was actually a referendum which had not been timely filed. (R.
at 283.) The court also found, as a matter of law, that the petition was unlawful even as
an initiative. (Id.) Finally, the court found, as a matter of law, that "the Clerk's decision
to allow the Initiative Petition to be placed on the ballot violates Utah's constitutional and
statutory law governing initiatives and referenda." (R. at 284.) Based on that, the court
granted Plaintiffs request for a permanent injunction barring the petition from being
placed on the ballot. (Id.) The court reserved the issue of Plaintiffs attorneys' fees. (R.
at 286.)
On November 7, 2002, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Attorneys' Fees, together with
a memorandum of law (R. at 296-305) and accompanying affidavits from counsel
describing in detail the hours spent on the case. (R. at 307-320.)

The combined

attorneys' fees sought by David Irvine, Janet Jenson, and Andy Stavros are $45,034.15.
(R. at 310.) The Defendants have not contested the fees sought by Plaintiff, as to their
reasonableness, and in various arguments before the court have so stipulated.

The parties filed reply and rebuttal memoranda on the Motion for Attorneys' Fees,
together with several affidavits which related to Plaintiffs assertion that the Defendants'
decision to place the petition on the 2002 general election ballot was motivated by the
Clerk's personal antagonism and bias toward fluoridation. The district court determined
that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary, and that hearing was scheduled on
August 7, 2003.
On August 7, 2003, following the evidentiary hearing, the parties presented
argument on the issue of attorneys' fees, and the court took the motion for fees under
advisement.
On August 8, 2003, the court convened a telephone conference with counsel and
issued a verbal order denying the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, with a request that the
County Attorney draft an order and submit it for signature. (R. at 875.)
Plaintiff reviewed the County Attorney's draft order, filed on August 29, 2003 (R.
at 832), and submitted its own proposed alternative findings of fact, conclusions of law
and order, on September 10, 2003. (R. at 834.)
The district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions, of Law, and Order (a
verbatim copy of the draft submitted by the County Attorney), which incorporated the
findings and conclusions of the court's October 15, 2002 Ruling, on October 3, 2003. (R.
at 852.)
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On October 31, 2003, Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal from the district court's
decision denying Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees. No other portion of the court's
Order has been appealed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, the district court erred by grafting two requirements onto the Private
Attorney General Doctrine which go beyond the Utah Supreme Court's Stewart
formulation and create a different legal standard. As a matter of law, the district court
concluded that the instant case could not be deemed "extraordinary" (even though the
court found it to be "unique") within the Stewart context because: (1) no common fund
was created from which attorneys' fees could be paid and no monetary benefit was
conferred upon those who benefited from the decision; and (2) the county officers who
placed an unlawful and unconstitutional petition on the ballot were not acting in bad faith
or because of bias. Neither of these additional standards is required under Stewart, and
neither is a requirement under the cases cited by the Utah Supreme Court as rationales for
its adoption of the Private Attorney General Doctrine. Moreover, the instant case meets
the Stewart criteria in that the Plaintiff successfully vindicated strong and societally
important public policies by challenging the improper acts of the county officers and
maintaining the integrity of the ballot. But for Plaintiffs lawsuit, the county officers,
who opposed water fluoridation and wanted a revote of the issue, would have succeeded
in doing so through an unlawful and unconstitutional scheme.

n

Second, the district court erred by using its two improper Stewart standards to
justify a "finding of fact" (actually a conclusion of law) that voting rights do not rise to
the "extraordinary" context of Stewart, and therefore while the instant case was "unique"
and of "great public importance," it did not rise to the Stewart level. However, in making
that "finding of fact," the district court ignored its previous findings and conclusions that
the instant case presented unique issues of great importance to the general public, Davis
County voters, and the [15] cities who must implement fluoridation; that it raised
important and unique issues concerning the right of the people to legislate directly; that
allowing the unlawful petition to go on the ballot would render the referenda provisions
of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code meaningless; that allowing the unlawful petition
to go on the ballot would subvert the Plaintiffs efforts and Davis County voters by
allowing petition sponsors to misuse the peoples' direct legislative power to subvert the
will of the majority; and that the public and Davis County voters have a real and
substantial interest in ensuring that the laws of initiative and referenda are scrupulously
followed. The denial of attorneys' fees was therefore based on an erroneous conclusion
of law.

The district court's inconsistent descriptions of the unique, important, and

extraordinary nature of the case relied upon distinctions without a difference, and were
simply arbitrary.
Third, while bias or bad faith are not required for an award of attorneys' fees
under Stewart, the evidence presented shows a continuing pattern of bias by the County
Clerk, who is an avowed fluoride opponent, and who tilted the decision process at every

12

juncture to allow an unlawful revote petition to go on the ballot. The district court's
blanket and general finding of fact that there was no bias and that the Clerk relied on the
advice of counsel at every stage of the process is not supported by the evidence, much of
which consisted of the unrefuted and unrebutted admissions of the Clerk and his legal
advisors, as well as a complete lack of any supporting records the Clerk was legally
responsible to maintain. The district court's blanket absolution of the Clerk for acting
beyond his statutory scope of authority exceeds the limits of reasonability and was
arbitrary in the face of the evidence.

No specific findings support the court's

conclusions.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY
CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DOCTRINE UNLESS: (a) PLAINTIFF'S SUCCESSFUL ADVOCACY OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS OF THE
MAJORITY OF VOTERS WHO APPROVED PUBLIC WATER
FLUORIDATION RESULTS IN A MONETARY BENEFIT AND CREATES
A COMMON FUND OUT OF WHICH FEES CAN BE PAID; AND (b) THE
ACTIONS OF COUNTY OFFICERS ARE UNDERTAKEN IN BAD FAITH.
When private citizens and their lawyers successfully vindicate important
constitutional and statutory rights in behalf of the public at large, who should bear the
burden of the citizens' attorneys' fees? More particularly, where the taxpayers' resources
are wholly funding the defense of an unconstitutional or unlawful action, is it equitable
and just that the few citizens willing to go up against the government bear that financial
burden themselves where a court rules that the government erred?
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The Private Attorney General Doctrine enunciated in Stewart v. Utah Public
Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994) provides an equitable remedy in such
instances. The essential facts of Stewart are strikingly similar to the instant case: the
public agencies charged to regulate utilities all signed off on an unlawful rate plan;
private citizens were the only ones left to challenge the unlawful plan; but for the
plaintiffs successful appeal, the unlawful scheme would have remained in place; and the
private plaintiffs thus successfully vindicated an important public policy.
A. In Stewart, The Government Officers AH Joined To Support An Unlawful
Rate Plan.
In 1990, U.S. West proposed an incentive rate regulation plan in which
shareholders and ratepayers would share company profits in excess of a specified rate of
return on equity. Id. at 762. U.S. West, the Division of Public Utilities, and the
Committee of Consumer Services then presented the Public Service Commission with a
stipulation agreeing to the U.S. West incentive plan. The Commission made certain
findings as a prelude to rejecting the stipulation, but then adopted a rate incentive plan of
its own without a hearing or argument. Id. at 763-766. A group of private citizens
appealed the Commission's Order, and challenged the lawfulness of the rate of return
U.S. West had been granted.

As Justice Stewart noted, "In this proceeding, the

Commission and the Division of Public Utilities have aligned themselves with U.S. West.
The Committee of Consumer Services intervened in the proceedings before the

14

Commission, but has taken no position on this appeal and has not appeared as a party."
Id. at 762.
In Stewart, the regulated utility, the Commission, the Division, and the Committee
agreed with an incentive rate plan which only the customers argued was unlawful and
unconstitutional. When the customers appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, the utility,
the Commission, and the Division all appeared against the customers as opposing parties,
and the one state entity specifically charged by statute to represent the interests of
residential and small business customers made no appearance and took no position. The
customers were entirely on their own. They hired their own private attorneys, and in the
end they prevailed on the merits. The Utah Supreme Court held that the rate plan was
illegal.
The Court applied the Private Attorney General Doctrine to award the Stewart
plaintiffs their attorneys' fees:
Courts also have awarded attorney fees to a party as a "private attorney
general" when the "vindication of a strong or societally important public policy"
takes place and the necessary costs in doing so "transcend the individual plaintiffs
pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization [citing Serrano v. Priest 569
P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977)]. Id. at 783.
There is no doubt that the plaintiffs in this case have conferred substantial
benefits on all [U.S.West] ratepayers. Based on the authorities discussed above,
we conclude that the facts before us warrant an award of attorney fees to
plaintiffs' counsel under this court's inherent equitable powers. Id. at 783.
To the extent [on remand] the Commission finds, after consideration of the
effects of today's ruling on the rate proceeding before it, that [U.S. West] must
disgorge overcharges pursuant to an exception to the rule against retroactive
ratemaking, plaintiffs award of attorney fees should come out of that fund
[citations omitted]. Id. at 783.
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In the alternative, if no such fund is created, we find that the private
attorney general exception to the American rule is applicable to this case and
that [U.S. West] should be ordered to pay those fees. Id. at 783, emphasis added.
As set out throughout this opinion, plaintiffs have successfully vindicated
an important public policy benefitting all of the ratepayers in the state. Plaintiffs,
a handful of ratepayers acting entirely on their own, took on [U.S. West], the
Public Service Commission, and the Division of Public Utilities and have
succeeded in having the Commission's rate of return set aside as unlawful, section
54-4-4.1(2) declared unconstitutional, and the Commission's "incentive" plan held
invalid. It is significant that the Committee of Consumer Services, which by
statute is charged with the responsibility of representing consumer interests, made
no appearance at all on this appeal and that the Commission and the Division of
Public Utilities have opposed the ratepayers on all issues. Id at 783.
The results achieved by the ratepayers will necessarily benefit all [U.S.
West] ratepayers in the state of Utah especially as to future rates, irrespective of
whether a refund of past overcharges might ultimately be ordered.. Here, [U.S.
West has collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful. . But for the
plaintiffs9 action, all that would have been unchallenged. . In the absence of a
common fund, and under these circumstances, it is appropriate to require the
shareholders of [U.S. West] to pay the cost of plaintiffs9 reasonable attorney
fees. Id. at 783, emphasis added.
B. Like the Stewart Government Officers, The Davis County Government
Officers All Joined To Place An Unlawful Revote Petition On The Ballot,
Leaving No One To Defend The Rights Of The Majority Of Voters.
In the instant case, 44,403 Davis County voters, a 52% majority in the November
7, 2000 general election, enacted water fluoridation as the law in Davis County pursuant
to a resolution placed on the general election ballot by the County Commission under
authority granted in Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-11 l(l)(c). That 2000 fluoridation vote of the
people was the very kind of direct legislative power the Utah Supreme Court addressed in
Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1080 (Utah 2002). There, the court stated, "The
power of the legislature and the power of the people to legislate directly through initiative
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and referenda are coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share 'equal dignity.'" The
process of implementing that 2000 general election vote on fluoridation has taken three
years to fully accomplish.
In early 2001, a small group of anti-fluoride activists decided to circulate what
they styled an "initiative petition" seeking a revote on fluoridation in the 2002 general
election, using the identical language which appeared on the 2000 ballot. On May 1,
2001, a week before their petition had even been formally submitted for circulation
approval, the Davis County Clerk advised them that if they gathered the requisite number
of signatures prior to the submission deadline, the petition would go on the 2002 ballot.
The e-mail message stated:
We are in concurrence that if all applicable election law requirements are
met related to the filing of the petition [if filed on time with the necessary number
of signatures], it may be accepted by my office as a qualified countywide initiative
petition. (R. at 806, EX 9, emphasis added.)
The Clerk, Steve Rawlings, an avowed fluoridation opponent (R. at 874-51),
testified that as of that May 2001 date, he made no effort to evaluate the legality of the
petition, relying on advice from the Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney, Gerald Hess, to
accept the petition sponsors' request for petition forms (R. at 874-63, 64). Mr. Hess
testified that, "When [a petition] is first filed, as you know, the Supreme Court has said
that it's a ministerial act and you cannot block it, and that's the first point."
2

Mr. Hess was probably referring to Taylor v. South Jordan City Recorder, 972 P.2d
423, 424 (Utah 1998), in which the court stated: "Any determination of whether the
subject matter is appropriate for the initiative process is proper only after the petition has
been issued, completed, and returned." (Emphasis added.)
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The Clerk testified that prior to sending the May 1, 2001 e-mail message
committing to place the revote petition on the ballot (R. at 806, EX 9), he had "not asked
for a legal opinion about the lawfulness, I had asked Mr. Hess if we should [accept] that
petition and grant the signature page." (R. at 874-63.) Asked if at that time Mr. Hess
made no determination whether that was an initiative petition or a referendum, the Clerk
testified "That is correct." (R. at 874-64.)
Plaintiff agrees that the Clerk could not have refused to issue petition forms in
May 2001, but Plaintiff maintains that the May 1, 2001 e-mail message reveals a
continuing pattern of biased, anti-fluoridation conduct (going back to the 2000 general
election) intended to tilt the process toward his personal desire for a revote (R. at 87452). The Clerk pre-approved the as yet unsubmitted petition by telling the petition
sponsors that their petition would be "accepted by my office as a qualified countywide
initiative petition" if "all applicable election law requirements related to filing [i.e.
meeting the signature and filing time requirements] were met." (R. at 806, EX 9.) The
petition was pre-approved for the ballot a week before it was even submitted for
circulatory approval. The Clerk testified that a year later, in May 2002, he became a
petition signer, along with the County Commission Chairman and the County Attorney
(R. at 768; 874-64, 65).
As in Stewart, the Davis County officers who were responsible to uphold the law
enacted by the people in 2000, aligned themselves and the resources of the County in
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support of an unlawful scheme - here, an unconstitutional and unlawful petition seeking
to revoke the people's enactment. Those officers, who themselves had signed the petition
denouncing the 2000 fluoridation vote,3 allowed the government's role as the ballot
gatekeeper to be subverted at five critical stages:
1. Neither the Clerk nor His Counsel Vetted the Petition for Legality
Prior To July 8, 2002, When It Was Filed With Signatures.
According to the testimony, no analysis of legality was made between May 2001
and July 8, 2002. When asked whether he made any kind of legal analysis of a petition's
lawfulness at the time someone applies for petition signature forms, the Clerk testified, "I
do not. I turned it over to the attorney's office for that." (R. at 874-59.) The Clerk
testified that petition signatures were coming into his office throughout the period
November 2, 2001 through July 8, 2002 (R. at 874-123, 124.) The Clerk also testified
that he made no analysis of whether the petition was an initiative or a referendum prior to
July 9, 2002. (R. at 874-99.) He further testified: I was assuming it was an initiative
petition right from the beginning." (Id.) When asked whether the fact that the petition
came to him titled "Initiative Petition" was his basis for assuming the petition was legally
an initiative petition, the Clerk testified:
That would have been part of it, and Jerry Hess' comment to me that we
needed to accept it. I just assumed that meant it was an initiative petition . . I
understood that to mean that if all the timing deadlines were met and the proper
3

The petition itself made four unsubstantiated and highly inflammatory "findings of
fact" about the fluoridation vote. These "findings" claimed thatfluorideis a health
hazard, that its risks had been kept hidden, that fluoridation is unconstitutional, and that
the cost is astronomical. (R. at 806, EX 10, p.4.)
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sponsors were there, that I needed to accept the petition and give them a signature
page." (Id.)
When the petition signatures were finally submitted for verification on July 8,
2002, the Clerk still had made no effort to determine the petition's legality. His duty at
that point in time, he testified, was to "count the signatures and send the petition on to the
Commission." (R. at 874-98.). The Clerk just "assumed it was an initiative petition from
the beginning." (R. at 874-99.)
The Clerk also testified that during that same period, he had "a lot of discussion"
with his assigned attorney, Mr. Hess, as it related to the initiative process. When asked
if any of those discussions pertained to the legal sufficiency of the petition, the Clerk
testified, "I don't recall." (R. at 874-125, 126.) When asked if there had ever been any
discussions he could recall prior to July 8, 2002 that "referenced anything about this
being, rather than initiative, a referendum," the Clerk testified, "Never." (Id. at 126.) The
Clerk was then asked: .
Q: When was the first time you ever, in the course of this process, were
alerted to the argument that this might be a referendum rather than an initiative?
A: When Mr. Hess forwarded a copy of Mr. Irvine's July 29th [2002] letter
tome. (Id.)
The testimony of the Clerk's assigned counsel, Mr. Gerald Hess, the Chief
Civil Deputy County Attorney also confirms that no analysis for legality was
conducted even when the signatures had been received on July 8, 2002, nor before
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sending the petition to the County Commission on July 9, 2002. Mr. Hess was
asked:
Q: Where in all of this [process] does someone ask the question, is this a
lawful petition?
A: I suppose the Legislature could have given us the same authority that
the Lieutenant Governor has to make that decision . . . as I understand the statute,
there is not a requirement for that kind of decision to be made . . (R. at 874-159.)
Q: Are you telling me that if someone files a petition that proposes that the
voters of Davis County declare that Utah shall secede from the Union, doesn't
anybody have the authority to say, this isn't a lawful initiative? (Id.)
A: I believe that caselaw does, but I don't know that there is a statute that
does. I think at that point, yes, the Clerk could make a decision that it was
something . . . that could be withheld from the ballot. (R. at 874-160.)
Q: Is it your testimony, Mr. Hess, that once the petition is received with the
correct number of signatures by the Clerk, and they were counted up and totaled,
that he did not have the responsibility to make an evaluation of the legal
sufficiency of that petition? (Id.)
A: I think the Clerk had the obligation to submit it to the County
Commission. (Id.)
The signature verification process was concluded on July 8, 2002. The following
day, the Clerk certified the petition as "an initiative petition." At no time prior to that
certification, did anyone in County government attempt to determine whether it was a
legal, constitutional petition. That was the government's first failure in 2002 to protect
the public interest. These unrefuted admissions are directly contrary to the district court's
Findings of Fact Nos. 4 and 5 "that the Clerk sought the legal advice of counsel and
followed it at all stages," and that all of the officers followed the advice of legal counsel
and adhered to a position based on their interpretation of [the law]." The problem was
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not just one of incorrect analysis; it was that no analysis was done before the petition was
certified to the County Commission as something which it legally was not.
2. The Clerk, Who Supported And Signed The Unvetted Petition,
Certified It To The County Commission By Choosing A Statutory
Option Which Virtually Assured Ballot Placement.
The last petition signatures were received on July 8, 2002. On July 9, 2002,
having made no analysis of the petition's legality, the Clerk certified the revote petition
to the County Commission as an "initiative petition." (R. at 806, EX 12.) The Clerk also
testified that he understood his only duty, following receipt of the petition signature
sheets, was to "count the signatures and send the petition on to the Commission." (R. at
874-98.) The Clerk's decision to certify the petition as an initiative, whether it was such
or not, conveniently suited his personal interest in securing a revote. Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 20A-7-501(3), the legislative body (the Commission), following receipt of
an initiative petition, can either: (a) adopt or reject the proposed law without change
within 30 days; or (b) adopt the proposed law and refer it to the people or adopt it without
referral to the people; or (c) reject the proposed law. Subsection (d), however, provides
the kicker: "if the local legislative body rejects a proposed county ordinance or
amendment, or takes no action on it, the clerk shall submit it to the voters of the county at
the next general election. There is no corresponding Subsection (d) "automatic ballot
placement" provision for referenda.
The Clerk knew when he sent the petition to the Commission that if the
Commission rejected the petition or took no action on it, [the petition] would go on the
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ballot. (R. at 874-106.) When asked if the law "operates as kind of a conveyor belt to the
ballot," the Clerk testified, "Correct. Absolutely." (Id.) Contrary to the assumptions of
the Clerk and his attorney, a different section of the local initiative statute does, in fact,
contemplate a determination of a petition's legality at the time signatures are filed for
verification, just as the law does for referenda. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-507(5)(a) states:
If the local clerk refuses to accept and file any initiative petition, any voter
may apply to the supreme court for an extraordinary writ to compel him to do so
within ten days after the refusal.
The same language applies to referenda, at Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-607(4)(a). When
asked if the petition had been considered a referendum, and the Clerk had refused to send
it to the Commission, or if the Commission had taken no action on it, "there was no
automatic trip to the ballot for a referendum the way there would be for an initiative, is
that right?" The Clerk testified, "I think that's the case." (R. at 874-115.)
The Clerk failed to protect the public interest when he certified the petition to the
County Commission as a legal initiative, which it was not, under a statute which would
place the petition on the ballot even if the Commission rejected it or took no action. This
failure to properly vet the petition's legality was not even a near-miss. The district court
held that the petition not only was unlawful because it was "an untimely referendum
petition," but the petition was unlawful "even had it been an initiative petition." (R. at
283.) The County officers who signed the petition all wanted a revote, but they still had
an obligation to the citizens as the gatekeepers to the ballot. Therefore, their failure to vet
the petition for legality before launching it onto the ballot is inexplicable, except as over-
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eagerness on the part of the Clerk to accomplish his private goal of having a revote on
fluoridation. This merger of private interest with public responsibility is the flip side of a
problem addressed in Taylor v. South Jordan City Recorder, 972 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah
1998), where the court explained its reasoning for not allowing a clerk to refuse to furnish
initiative forms, even if the subject matter is inappropriate for an initiative. Using a
hypothetical assumption that a clerk might be opposed to a petition, the court wrote:
"Under these circumstances, to give a clerk the power to make legal decisions about the
propriety of petition requests and thus about the initiative petition's circulation is to invite
abuse." In the instant case, the abuse of power came at the point where the Clerk elected
to accept and file a petition as an initiative, with an almost automatic trip to the ballot,
without vetting it for legality. His personal desire for a revote trumped his duty to vet for
legality.
3. The Clerk's Certification Of The Unvetted Petition To The
Commission Assured That The County, Not The Sponsors, Would
Underwrite The Costs In Any Lawsuit Challenging The Legality Of
The Sponsors' Petition.
The Clerk's certification of the unvetted petition also determined that the petition's
sponsors would not pay the costs of defending its legality. If the Clerk or the County
Attorney had questioned the legality of the petition and refused to file it after July 8,
2002, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-507(5)(a), then the burden of defending the
unlawful petition would have fallen on the sponsors of the petition. Had that happened,
the resources of the County would have been marshaled to defend the integrity of the
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2000 fluoridation mandate. Therefore, the Clerk's certification decision, without vetting
the petition for legality, placed on Plaintiff the total burden and expense of defending the
2000 general election results. From this point forward, the County would pay all of the
legal fees for the petition sponsors, leaving no one but private citizens and their private
attorneys to defend the lawful decision of the majority of voters and taxpayers.
The July 9, 2002, Minutes of the County Commission (R. at 806, EX 13) state:
Steve Rawlings, Clerk/Auditor, and Pat Beckstead, Election Coordinator,
presented the Certification for the Initiative Petition Re-vote on Mandatory
Fluoridation Act.. . The recommendation of the Commission is to forward the
information to the Davis County Attorney Office for review and preparation of
legal opinion to be given to the Commission on or before the next meeting of
August 6, 2002. (Emphasis added. No opinion existed as of July 9, 2002.)
The Clerk, the Commission, and the Board of Health all shared the same attorney for
legal advice, Mr. Gerald Hess. (R. at 874-153.)
4. The County Had Actual Notice Of The Petition's Illegality Before
The Commission Allowed It To Go On The Ballot, But Even Then, The
Officers Did Not Make A Correct Legal Assessment.
On July 29, 2002, Plaintiffs counsel sent a letter to the County Attorney setting
out Plaintiffs analysis that the petition was unlawful because the sponsors' recourse for a
revote was through a referendum, and the time for filing a referendum petition had long
since passed. That letter sufficiently alarmed the Clerk that he took two unusual steps.
First, he sent his own recommendation (R. at 806, EX 11) on August 1, 2002, to his
official attorney, Mr. Hess, stating that after study, the Clerk had determined that if the
petition was not an initiative (even though "the petition filed does have the heading
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"Initiative Petition"), "the petition could be constructively construed as having the intent
of a 'Referendum Petition.9" The Clerk urged Mr. Hess to "consider" that alternate
construction in rendering his legal opinion to the County Commission, even though he
had no further decision-making responsibility for what became of the petition (R. at 874107). The second action then taken by the Clerk, because Mr. Hess had not responded
quickly to the August 1, 2002 letter, was to turn to his son for a separate legal opinion
about the petition's legality. Mr. Troy Rawlings is a deputy prosecutor in the Davis
County Attorney's office.
When the Clerk was asked when he determined that the petition could be a
referendum, he testified:
I never did make that determination. I received a copy of the letter from
Mr. Hess that you [Plaintiffs counsel, David Irvine] sent to him that was quite a
lengthy letter in which you outlined your feelings that it was not an initiative
petition and was a referenda. After I received that letter is the time that I actually, my concern stemmed over possible litigation once again . ." (R. at 874106, 107.)
Troy Rawlings, also a petition signer ("Yeah, you bet") (R. at 874-72), testified
that the Clerk requested an opinion from him about the legal status of the petition, on or
about August 5, 2002, because Gerald Hess "had not responded to the Clerk's letter to
him dated August 1st (R. at 806, EX 11) and had "not responded yet to give [the Clerk]
an opinion related to a referendum issue." (R. at 874-74.)
Troy Rawlings testified that he advised the Clerk on August 5, 2002, that the
petition "was a valid and timely filed referendum," (R. at 874-80) and that the Clerk
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"should consider the petition to be a referendum." (R. at 874-81.) Months later, Troy
Rawlings was still firm in that opinion, testifying in an affidavit he prepared [on February
10, 2003], "I maintain at this time, as I did when asked by the Clerk/Auditor for my
opinion [August 5, 2002] that the correct legal constitutional analysis is that the document
in question is and was a timely filed referendum." (R. at 874-85.)
Troy Rawlings also testified regarding his legal opinion and advice to his father
regarding his father's duties as the Clerk:
The caselaw and the statutes in question do not require the public official to
determine the constitutionality of the initiative petition or referendum process
used. As far as process is concerned, the local election clerk only need consider
the requirements of the statutes as relates to timing, the signatures and name
verification. Once that is done, the Clerk marks the front sufficient or insufficient.
(R. at 874-81.)
Speaking of his consultations with his son, after August 1st, the Clerk also testified:
Even though I was not required by law to make a legal interpretation as to
the validity of the petition, I did consult with legal counsel to determine that there
was a strong possibility the petition could be constructively considered a
referendum. (R. at 874-96, 97.)
When asked what his legal basis was for concluding that he had no obligation to
make a legal interpretation about the validity of the petition, the Clerk answered, "Mr.
Hess." (Id. at 97.) However, the only specific advice from Mr. Hess to which the Clerk
testified was advice given in April or May 2001, when Mr. Hess told the Clerk to accept
the petition sponsors' request for petition forms (R. at 806, EX 9; R. 874-63), and at that
time Mr. Hess had not given the Clerk an opinion about whether the petition was a lawful
initiative petition. (R. at 874-64.)
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Troy Rawlings' opinion on August 5, 2002 that the petition was a "timely filed
referendum" was based on insufficient legal research. In February 2003, he discovered a
1988 Utah Supreme Court decision that specifically invalidated his calculation of
"timeliness" which he had urged his father to pursue. Referring to Tobias v. City of
South Jordan, 972 P.2d 373 (Utah 1998), Troy Rawlings testified:
[R]egrettably, I missed that case initially in August of 2002 because I had at
my disposal, when my dad presented me the August 1st letter (R. at 806, EX 11),
an unannotated section of the code .. I think Tobias is wrongly decided, but my
opinion is irrelevant. (R. at 874-86, 87.)
It is evident from these events and the testimony of Steve Rawlings, his son who
gave him legal advice, and Gerald Hess, that the first and only effort to vet the petition
for legality took place after July 29, 2002, when Plaintiffs counsel contacted the County
Attorney about it.

Mr. Hess, after the petition had already been certified to the

Commission, then made his own analysis of the petition, and concluded it was a lawful
initiative. Whatever may have gone into the County Attorney's legal analysis, when it
was finally made for the Commission, it was incorrect, as the district court held, and the
Clerk was never advised of anyone's doubts about the petition's legality.
5. The Commission Allowed The Petition To Go On The Ballot By
Default And Without Opposing Comment.
The last opportunity for the County officers to bar the unlawful petition from the
ballot, and place the financial burden of defending an unlawful initiative back on its
sponsors rather than the taxpayers, was the County Commission meeting of August 6,
2002. As stated in the minutes, the Commission received the legal opinion from Mr.
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Hess that the petition was an initiative. (R. at 806, EX 1.) Mr. Hess took the
Commissioners through the statutory options for petitions submitted as initiatives. Mr.
Hess had previously told the Clerk that he was going to advise the Commission to take no
action on the petition (R. at 874-77, 127, 128), and the Commission followed that advice.
(R. at 806, EX 1.) Chairman McConkie stated that he felt "neutrality is in the best
interests of the Commission," and he called twice for a motion and none was given.
With that decision to not act, the Commission, knowingly, allowed the "go-toballot default" of §20A-7-501(3)(d) to kick in.

Neither Commission Chairman

McConkie, nor the Clerk disclosed at the meeting that they were petition signers who
wanted a revote. Nor did Mr. Hess disclose that the County Attorney was also a signer
who wanted a revote. Prior to the Chairman's call for a motion on the petition, Plaintiffs
counsel asked to be heard in order to rebut Mr. Hess' theory that the petition was a lawful
initiative. The Chairman refused to allow Plaintiffs counsel to speak in opposition, and
indeed, refused to allow any comment at all from the audience. (R. at 874-156.) As the
Minutes state:
The Initiative Petition is now sent to Steve Rawlings, Davis County
Clerk/Auditor, for preparation of putting it on the ballot in November according to
election law. Mr. Rawlings stated that his office will ask the attorney's office for
the official wording and move forward to place it on the ballot. (R. at 806, EX 1.)
As of August 6, 2002, the County government was four-square behind an unlawful
petition and had placed it on the ballot, leaving only private citizens to defend the
fluoridation law enacted by the voters in 2000.
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C. The Instant Case Meets All Of The Stewart Criteria For A Fee Award
Under The Private Attorney General Doctrine.
The Plaintiff here, like those in Stewart, took on the government officers who are
charged to protect the public interest, succeeded in having the petition declared
unconstitutional and unlawful, and succeeded in barring it from the ballot in 2002. They
preserved the integrity of the ballot and election process, which is a "public good"
essential to all the 250,000 citizens of the County. All 18 water systems in Davis County
are now fluoridated, consistent with the 2000 vote of the people, and the 15 cities charged
to implement fluoridation were able to do so without the uncertainty of a possible revote.
In its October 15, 2002 Ruling on the merits of the case, the district court held
that:
(a) the issues presented by Plaintiff are of great importance to the general
public (R. at 280); (b) the lawsuit raises important and unique issues concerning
the right of the people to legislate directly (Id.); (c) to allow the Initiative Petition
to be placed on the ballot would effectively render the referenda provisions in the
Utah Constitution and the Utah Code meaningless and allow the sponsors to
subvert the important timelines established by the Legislature for referenda (Id. at
282); the Davis County Clerk's decision to allow the Initiative Petition to be
placed on the ballot violates Utah constitutional and statutory law governing
initiatives and referenda (Id. at 284).
In Serrano v. Priest 569 P.2d 1303, (Cal. 1977), which is cited in Stewart, that
court wrote:
In spite of variations in emphasis, all of these formulations [of the private
attorney general doctrine] seem to suggest that there are three basic factors to be
considered in awarding fees on this theory. These are in general: (1) the strength
or societal importance of the public policy being vindicated by the litigation, (2)
the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on
the plaintiff, (3) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision. Id. at
1314.
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If the people's right to legislate directly is a sacrosanct fundamental right, the defense of
what has been directly legislated is surely the vindication of a strong and societally
important public policy.
Following its description of the results achieved by the plaintiffs who challenged
U.S. West and the state regulatory agencies, the court wrote in Stewart: "But for
plaintiffs' action, all that would have been unchallenged and none of [U.S.West's]
ratepayers would have had any relief." (Stewart, at 783.) The "but for" standard was a
principal factor in the court's decision to deny attorney fees in Shipman v. Evans, 500
Utah Adv. Rep. 9, ^[24 (Utah 2004). In that case, the plaintiffs had not achieved success
through any of their judicial claims (all had been dismissed and injunctive relief had been
denied), and had not conferred a public benefit through a court order.

The court

distinguished the Shipman request for fees from Stewart on that basis.
D. The District Court Erred By Requiring A Common Fund Or Monetary
Benefit.
A principal reason cited by the district court for denying Plaintiffs Motion for
Attorney's Fees was that in the instant case, the court held that no monetary benefit
accrued to the residents of Davis County because of the lawsuit undertaken by Plaintiff.
In its October 3, 2003 Order, the district court made Finding of Fact No. 8 (R. at 854)
that fees should not be awarded to Plaintiff because "the litigation did not result in a
common fund being created from which attorney's fees can be paid . ." The centrality of
that consideration was highlighted in these comments by the district court in argument:
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THE COURT: Of course, in Stewart there werefinancialbenefits that were
given. There are no financial benefits here that have been testified to. (R. at 874205.)
THE COURT: Oh, I agree, the Supreme Court recognizes that there's this
Attorney General Exception if there's a vindication of important public policy,
public right. But then in the application of that rule in this specific case, it was
financial benefit that it seems to me was the most persuasive element. (Id. at 874207.)
With respect, Plaintiff submits that the district court incorrectly equated "societally
important public policy" with monetary benefit, which is not a standard of law Stewart
imposed. There are a host of "societally important" public policies, beginning with the
Bill of Rights, which, when government violates them, do not involve monetary benefit.
The right to vote is a fundamental right to which no price tag is attached. The right of the
people to directly legislate, according to Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1081 (Utah
2002) "is sacrosanct and a fundamental right." However, that sacrosanct right doesn't
involve money. The Stewart award of fees wasn't based on the fact that the successful
plaintiffs put money in the pockets of ratepayers, although that was one consequence of
the ruling. The critical language is the few sentences [Stewart at 783] where the court
directed the Public Service Commission to require U.S. West's shareholders to pay the
legal fees even if no money for refunds was to be had from a common fund:
. . . if no such fund [accumulated overcharges] is created . . .Here, [U.S.
West] has collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful and was authorized
by the Commission's unlawful "incentive regulation" order . . . In the absence of a
common fund, and under these circumstances, it is appropriate to require the
shareholders of [U.S. West] to pay the cost of plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees.
(Emphasis added.)
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The "societally important public policy" the Stewart plaintiffs vindicated was not a
rate refund - indeed, the court was not sure there would even be one - it was the
challenge to an unconstitutional incentive rate plan: the plan was an assault on the
Constitution, irrespective of whether it raised or lowered rates.

The district court's

Finding of Fact No. 8, in the October 3, 2003 Order, that fees could not be awarded under
Stewart because no common fund had been created, was a clear error of law.
E. The District Court Erred In Requiring Bad Faith.
In its October 3, 2003 Finding No. 8, the Court stated, ". . nor does the case, in
the absence of evidence of bad faith, constitute an extraordinary case." (R. at 854,
emphasis added.) That single sentence grafts another new legal standard onto the Stewart
decision, for which there is no basis in the Utah Supreme Court's enunciation of the
Private Attorney General Doctrine, nor in Serrano's. The district court used "absence of
bad faith" to distinguish between "unique" and "extraordinary," but "bad faith" or "bias"
or "abdication" were not even terms the Utah Supreme Court used in Stewart to describe
the actions of the Public Service Commission and state regulators, yet it applied the
Private Attorney General Doctrine notwithstanding. There was no finding in Stewart that
the Public Service Commission was guilty of bad faith when it adopted an
unconstitutional incentive rate plan - it was just mistaken. Exactly as the Defendants
claim here for themselves, the Commission and the Division and the Committee in
Stewart were all advised by their legal counsel and presumably followed that advice. In
the Utah Supreme Court's view, they got the law wrong, and "good intentions" or
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"following the advice of counsel" did not excuse adoption of an unlawful rate plan or
preclude an award of attorneys' fees to the citizens who successfully challenged the
unlawful plan.
The district court's addition of a non-existent "bad faith" requirement to the
Stewart decision, as a legal standard for defining the "exceptional" or "extraordinary"
result of a case was an error of law.
II. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE PRIVATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE BY CONCLUDING THAT THE
CASE WAS "UNIQUE BUT NOT EXTRAORDINARY," IN DISREGARD
FOR ITS OWN CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT: (a) THE ISSUES
PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO
THE GENERAL PUBLIC; (b) THE LAWSUIT RAISED IMPORTANT
AND UNIQUE ISSUES CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
LEGISLATE DIRECTLY; (c) TO ALLOW THE [UNLAWFUL
INITIATIVE PETITION TO BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT WOULD
EFFECTIVELY RENDER THE REFERENDA PROVISIONS OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CODE MEANINGLESS; (d)
ALLOWING THE [UNLAWFUL INITIATIVE] PETITION ON THE
BALLOT WOULD PERMIT THE SPONSORS TO MISUSE THE
PEOPLES' DIRECT LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THWART THE WILL
OF THE MAJORITY OF DAVIS COUNTY VOTERS; AND (e) DAVIS
COUNTY VOTERS HAVE A REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN
ENSURING THAT THE LAWS OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDA ARE
SCRUPULOUSLY FOLLOWED AND THE ELECTION PROCESS
ADHERES TO THE RULE OF LAW.
The district court's October 3, 2003 Order stated in Finding of Fact No. 7, ". .
even though voting rights are a significant issue in the context of this case, such
significance does not rise to the level envisioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart v.
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Utah Public Service Commission . . (R. at 854.) This language reflects the opinion
expressed by the district court in the August 8, 2003 conference:
THE COURT: While I find that voting rights are significant, I can't find in
this case that it's the type of case envisioned by the Supreme Court in their Stewart
decision. But Footnote 19 in the Stewart decision gave guidance that attorneys'
fees should only be granted in extraordinary cases. In my view, although this is a
unique case, it's not an extraordinary case. (R. at 875-7.)
The district court's opinion in that respect was an erroneous conclusion of law. In
its Footnote 19, the Stewart court stated: "In holding that the private attorney general
doctrine applies here, we note the exceptional nature of this case. We further note that
any future award of attorney fees under this doctrine will take an equally extraordinary
case." (Stewart at 783.)
The district court's Finding of Fact No. 8 of the October 2, 2003 Order (R. at 854),
stating that the instant case is "unique but not extraordinary" is also aimed at Footnote 19
from Stewart. However, given the language the district court used to describe the unique
public importance of the case and its far-reaching result in the October 15, 2002 Ruling,
the subsequent dismissive qualification used in the 2003 Order can only be read as an
arbitrary distinction without a difference. A finding that a case is "unique" is tantamount
to a finding that it is "extraordinary." The district court incorporated all of its October
15, 2002 Ruling into its October 2, 2003 Order. That earlier language, which was not
withdrawn or modified, or even distinguished, is instructive:
. . the Court finds that the issues presented by plaintiff are of great public
importance to the general public, Davis County voters and [the 15] cities within
Davis County who must implement fluoridation. (R. at 280.)
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This lawsuit raises important and unique issues concerning the right of the
people to legislate directly. (Id.)
To allow the petition to be placed on the ballot would effectively render the
provisions in the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code meaningless . . (R. at 282.)
The Davis County Clerk's decision to allow the Initiative Petition to be
placed on the ballot violates Utah constitutional and statutory law governing
initiatives and referenda. (R. at 284.)
Allowing the Initiative Petition to be placed on the ballot would subvert the
efforts of plaintiffs members and Davis County voters by allowing the petition
sponsors to misuse the peoples' direct legislative power to thwart the will of a
majority of Davis County voters. (Id.)
. . the public and Davis County voters in particular, have a real and
substantial interest in ensuring that the laws of initiative and referenda are
scrupulously followed and the election process adheres to the rule of law. (R. at
285.)
Because of the important and unique issues involved in this lawsuit, the
Court finds that the public interest is advanced by issuing an injunction. (Id.)
There is no argument that the scope of the Stewart decision involved a utility
operating throughout the state of Utah, whereas the instant case involved just the 250,000
population of Davis County and its 15 cities and 18 water systems. However, the district
court's leap from the laudatory language of 2002 to its constricted language in 2003, with
no reconciliation of the cumulative findings of important public policy in 2002 to the
stark "unique but not extraordinary" language in 2003 is unreasoned, unexplained, and
arbitrary. Webster defines "extraordinary" to mean "beyond what is usual, ordinary or
established; exceptional in character, amount, degree." Correspondingly, the definition
of "unique" is "existing as the only one or as the sole example; single, solitary in type or
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characteristics; having no like or equal." (Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 1989,
dilithium Press, Ltd.) Indeed, Webster's Collegiate Thesaurus (1988, Merriam Webster,
Inc.) uses the two words interchangeably, as synonyms.
Moreover, it is hard to square the district court's dismissive nod to voting rights as
a mere "significant issue in the context of this case, but such significance does not rise to
the level envisioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart" (R. at 854), with the Utah
Supreme Court's soaring pronouncement in Gallivan that those same voting rights
associated with direct legislation are "sacrosanct and must be maintained inviolate." Id.
at 1081.
The Stewart decision at Footnote 18 (p.782) also discussed the "substantial
benefit" basis for equitable awards of attorneys' fees where a litigant obtains a decision
resulting in the conferral of a "substantial benefit of a pecuniary or nonpecuniary nature."
This Court amplified the substantial benefit theory in Levanger v. Highland Estates
Properties, 80 P.3d 569, 576 (Utah App. 2003). While Levanger involved a derivative
action under Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court cited Stewart as
the basis for a "substantial benefit" award of fees where individual members of a
homeowners' association sued on a complaint that the association had improperly
amended the association's covenants, conditions and restrictions, and that the use of mailin ballots was improper. This Court awarded attorneys' fees of $41,325.15, and stated:
We agree with the holdings of these cases and conclude that a nonmonetary benefit, including the promotion and vindication of shareholders' voting
rights, can be a substantial benefit in the context of a derivative action . . We also
agree with the trial court's observation that it would be inappropriate to attempt to
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offset the non-monetary benefit conferred upon Highland Estates against the
Levangers' attorney fees . . if courts were to engage in this process, it would
discourage derivative plaintiffs from bringing actions to confer a substantial nonmonetary benefit upon a corporation or association because of the possibility that
they would be required to bear the burden of all or part of the attorney fees
incurred in bringing the action. (Id. At 576.)
If, as a matter of equity, a fee award under the substantial benefit theory is
appropriate where private shareholders successfully vindicate the charter and voting
rights of a relatively small homeowner association, the equities cannot be less compelling
where private citizens successfully vindicate constitutional and statutory voting rights of
the public at large in a county of 250,000 people, 15 cities, and 18 water systems. To not
do so raises exactly the discouragement which this Court wisely decried.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING NO EVIDENCE OF
BAD FAITH, BIAS, OR ABDICATION OF DUTIES DESPITE A
PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL AND IMPROPER OFFICIAL ACTIONS BY
COUNTY OFFICERS OVER THE COURSE OF TWO YEARS IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR PERSONAL OPPOSITION TO FLUORIDATION,
CULMINATING IN THEIR PLACEMENT ON THE BALLOT OF AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL REVOTE PETITION, AND
THEREBY EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVING ALL DAVIS COUNTY VOTERS
OF DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL DECISIONS
REGARDING BALLOT INTEGRITY.
While a finding of "bad faith" or "bias" or "abdication of duty" is not a
requirement to justify an attorneys' fee award under Stewart, Plaintiff presented evidence
of bias in a day-long evidentiary hearing at which the County Clerk and his legal advisors
all testified regarding their actions from July 26, 2000, the time the fluoridation question
was placed on the 2000 general election ballot, through the Clerk's placement of the

38

unlawful initiative petition on the ballot on August 6, 2002. The Clerk was personally
opposed to fluoridation, and Plaintiff asserts that the documents and testimony show a
consistent tilt on the part of the Clerk at every juncture where he could make an official
decision which would promote his personal opposition to fluoridation. This became
evident after the County Commission put its fluoridation resolution on the ballot in 2000,
and it continued through the Clerk's 2002 critical actions and decisions about the petition.
The district court's October 3, 2003 Order makes the following blanket, general,
non-specific findings of fact (which were repeated as Conclusions of Law):
Finding of Fact No. 4. (R. at 853) Additionally the Court finds that the
defendant Clerk/Auditor sought the legal advice of Chief Civil Deputy County
Attorney Gerald Hess at all stages of the initiative process and followed the advice
of legal counsel and that he performed his duties and responsibilities as the
Clerk/Auditor thought appropriate and in conformance with his good faith
understanding of what the law was at the time. See also, Conclusion of Law No. 2
(R. at 855).
Finding of Fact No. 5. (R. at 854) The Court finds that the Defendants . .
followed the advice of legal counsel and adhered to a legal position based upon
their interpretation of the Utah Constitution, the . . statutes . . and documents filed
by the petition sponsors. See also Conclusion of Law No. 2 (R. at 855).
Finding of Fact No. 6. (R. at 854) The Court finds that there is no evidence
of bad faith, bias or abdication of duties on the part of the Clerk/Auditor or
Commissioners in the events of 2002 and the suggestions of bias from events in
2000-2001 are simply not persuasive that the Clerk/Auditor abused or exceeded
the scope of his authority as a public official. See also Conclusion of Law No. 1
(R. at 855).
Finding No. 7. (R. at 854) The Court finds that there was no evidence that
the actions of the County Government was an attempt to subvert the rights of those
who voted in 2000 . ."
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The district court's blanket absolution of the Clerk's conduct is inconsistent with
the unrefiited evidence as to four egregious matters indicative of bias: first, the Clerk's
unauthorized injection of himself into the issue of fluoridation costs in 2000 and 2000,
beyond the statutory authority of his office. Second, his improper use of the 2000 Voter
Information Pamphlet to promote his own slanted point of view about fluoridation costs.
Third, his improper use of the 2000 Voter Information Pamphlet to only address
fluoridation while omitting any information about a sales tax increase which was also on
the ballot, and which had a financial impact on Davis residents nearly six times that of
fluoridation. Fourth, even after the voters enacted fluoridation in the 2000 election, the
Clerk continued to agitate about costs with an eye to a revote and beyond the statutory
authority of his office.

Fifth, his failure to vet the unlawful petition for legality before

certifying it as an initiative.
A. Prior To The 2000 Election, The Clerk, Without Statutory Authority,
Injected Himself Into The Issue Of Fluoridation Costs.
In accordance with the authority granted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 19-4lll(l)(c), the Davis County Commission ("Commission") on July 26, 2000 adopted a
resolution to place an opinion question relating to the fluoridation of all public water
systems within Davis County on the 2000 general election ballot. (R. at 658, EX 1.)
The County Clerk, Mr. Steve Rawlings ("Clerk"), was an opponent of fluoridation
during the fall of 2000, and voted "No" on the ballot question. He also testified that he
had "concerns about fluoride, and they relate mostly to cost issues," and that he also had
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"concerns about personal freedoms" associated with fluoridation (R. at 874-51). When
asked if he agreed with a "finding" in the voter initiative petition, which prompted the
action herein, which stated: "True county-wide costs have not been disclosed, and recent
cost estimates are astronomical," the Clerk testified, "I do." (R. at 874-67.)
The Davis County government neither operates nor manages any public water
systems. (R. at 874-12.) The County Commission has no authority to direct the affairs of
incorporated cities and towns within Davis County (R. at 874-13), and the Clerk has no
authority to audit the affairs of the cities and towns (R. at 874-14).
Neither Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-1 nor § 17-20-1.7 makes the cost of water
fluoridation in cities and water districts a matter of official concern for the Clerk or
Auditor; however, the Clerk testified that "there is a provision in the code that allows the
Auditor to check into any financial situation he deems necessary in the County." (R. at
874-16.) Although asked to provide any such citation, even as a late-filed exhibit, the
Clerk and his counsel did not do so. There is no such blanket audit authority into the
affairs of separate political subdivisions.
During the fall of 2000, the Clerk and his staff became actively immersed in
gathering information about the costs of fluoridation to the cities in Davis County (R. at
874-17), and queried not only other states about fluoridation costs, but also telephoned
Mr. Scott Paxman from the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District to discuss the cost
estimates Mr. Paxman had put together for the Board of Health (R. at 874-18). Mr.
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Paxman had faxed his cost estimate data (R. at 806, EX 6) to the Clerk on September 21,
2000 (R. at 874-29).
The Clerk also instructed the election coordinator to "call all city and water
districts to determine if they would like to submit estimates for my publication." (R. at
874-18.)
The publication for which the Clerk was gathering fluoridation cost information
was the Voter Information Pamphlet his office published in late October 2000 (R. at 806,
EX 2) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-402.
The Clerk testified that the County Commission directed him to gather the
information about fluoridation costs. (R. at 874-20.) He testified that the Commission
Chairman [Dannie McConkie] "directed me at one time that I could get information from
the rest of the cities," (R. at 874-21). However, the Clerk also testified that he was not
aware of any record of such a discussion. (Id.) Nor did he or his counsel ever provide
any such record, even as a late-filed exhibit. Plaintiffs counsel could find no such record
in a search of the Commission Minutes for 2000. The Commissioners, singly or jointly,
cannot confer authority on any county officer to act beyond the statutory jurisdiction of
his office, and even if they could, they can only make such policy decisions in a public
meeting and on the record.

Since there were no records of the Clerk's claimed

authorization to act as a fluoride cost arbiter, it must be presumed that no authorization
was given. The district court's Findings of Fact simply ignore a series of ultra vires
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actions for which no authority exists, nor was voted by the legislative body, nor was
recorded.
The official record of actions taken by the County Commission is the Commission
Minutes, which the Clerk maintains (R. at 874-11). There are only two references in the
Commission Minutes for 2000 which make any mention of the Voter Information
Pamphlet. The first is October 2, 2000, which states:
Mr. Rawlings announced that voter information pamphlets regarding the
issue of fluoride that will be on the November Election ballot will be distributed in
the near future. (R. at 806, EX 4.)
The second is October 23, 2000, which states:
Steve Rawlings, Clerk/Auditor asked that it be noted for the minutes that
last Friday the Commission approved [sic] information pamphlet regarding
fluoride was mailed to all registered voters. The pamphlets are also available at all
city offices, libraries, WIC, and hopefully the COA centers of Davis County.
There will be pamphlets available at the polling places. Within the courthouse
there are pamphlets in the Commission, Treasurer, Recorder, and Clerk/Audit
offices. (R. at 806, EX 5.)
There is no record anywhere which indicates that the Commission ever saw or
approved the Voter Information Pamphlet before it was printed and distributed by the
Clerk.

The Clerk testified that he was "uncertain" whether there were any other

Commission Minute references in 2000 to the Voter Information Pamphlet (R. at 874-24),
and he produced none.
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B. The Clerk Used The 2000 Voter Information Pamphlet To Promote His
Own Slanted Point Of View About Fluoridation Costs.
The Clerk's Voter Information Pamphlet (R.806, EX 2) presented the text of the
fluoridation question as it would appear on the ballot (Id., p.2), and one Argument
Against Fluoridation (Id., p.4, 5), and one Argument For Fluoridation (Id., p.6, 7). In
addition, the Pamphlet contained a page entitled "Preliminary Information," (Id., p. 3)
which was prepared and inserted by the Clerk (R. at 874-26). This page purported to
inform voters of the "Cost of proposed measure # 2," and it then provided a table listing
only 4 of the 15 cities in the County. Costs for the 4 cities were shown as "Connection
Fee Annual Increase," ranging from $12 to $31, and as "Base Rate % Increase," ranging
from 17% to 22%. The page provides no other information about how those costs were
calculated, what the base comparisons were, or what any actual water costs were. The
Clerk's selected cost data exaggerated the cost offluoridationwith an eye to persuading
voters that the cost was astronomical - a term used in the petition's Finding D, with
which the Clerk agreed. (R. at 874-67.)
Even though the Clerk testified that he possessed cost estimate data from the
Weber Basin Conservancy District (R. at 874-18), (the largest water district serving
residents of Davis County (R. at 874-34)), he did not include that District's estimate of an
average per person per year cost of $2.00. He did not include that District's "Low Cost
Estimate of $1.18 per person per year" (R. at 806, EX 6, p.3), nor its "High Cost Estimate
of $2.10 per person per year" (Id., p.3). He did, however, state in his information that the
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Davis County Board of Health had estimated that the average per person per year cost of
fluoridation would be approximately $2.00 (R. 806, EX 2, p.3).

In view of the

controversy aboutfluoridationcosts, it would have been useful (and more fair) for voters
to have known that the much lower Board of Health cost estimate was aligned almost
exactly with the cost estimate provided by the largest water system operator in the
County.
The Clerk testified that he was "not sure" whether any authority for his cost data
page was found in Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-402 (R. at 874-26), and there is none.
The discovery of the Clerk's own page regarding the costs of fluoridation,
particularly the inclusion of only 4 of the 18 water systems in the County and the
dramatically high numbers used by the Clerk, was a surprise to the County Board of
Health and to its Chair, Dr. Beth Q. Beck (R. at 361, f7). The Interim Director of the
Davis County Health Department during 2000, Mr. Richard L. Harvey, testified that he
had never seen Page 3 of the Pamphlet prior to its publication in late October 2000 (R. at
874-173). He also testified that the Clerk had never discussed with him any of the cost
data included on Page 3 except for a sentence referring to the City of Fruit Heights (of
which Mr. Harvey was Mayor) (R. at 874-174). The Clerk testified that he "did not
recall" notifying the Board of Health that he intended to publish his own higher cost
information in the Pamphlet (R. at 874-36), and that he "did not recall" any attempt to
resolve the differences between his cost estimates and those of the Board of Health (R. at
874-37).
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Because the Board of Health believed the Clerk's cost data, as presented in the
Voter Information Pamphlet, was inaccurate and slanted, it prepared an advertisement
dated November 2, 2000 (R. at 806, EX 3), which was published in newspapers serving
Davis County. Mr. Harvey testified that he researched and produced the advertisement at
the Board of Health's request, "in reaction to the information that came out in the voter
information pamphlet." (R. at 874-174, 175.)
In contrast to the limited and selected cost data provided by the Clerk, the Board
of Health's presentation of cost data was sourced and comprehensive, on a city-by-city
and water district-by-water district basis.
C. The Clerk Used The 2000 Voter Information Pamphlet To Only Address
Fluoridation, While Omitting Any Information About A Sales Tax Increase
Which Was Also On the ballot, And Which Had A Financial Impact On Davis
Residents Nearly Six Times That Of Fluoridation.
On August 28, 2000, the Commission adopted a resolution to place on the 2000
general election ballot a proposal to impose an additional one-quarter cent sales and use
tax on all sales and uses within Davis County to fund a "fixed guideway and expanded
public transportation system" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-502. (R. at 658, EX
2). This resolution and the fluoridation resolution were both on the same general election
ballot. They were County Commission-sponsored resolutions.
The Clerk's 2000 Voter Information Pamphlet refers to and contains information
on only one of the two issues placed on the ballot by the County Commission. It is
entirely devoted to the issue of fluoridation. It makes no mention of the sales tax increase
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for transportation expansion within Davis County. The Clerk testified that he made no
inquiry into the financial impact of the transit sales tax increase on the voters of Davis
County (R. at 874-47).
The parties stipulated to the accuracy of a calculation that the sales tax increase for
transportation expansion in Davis County produced revenue during its first full year of
collection in the amount of $6,665,986.50, and that such amount divided by a Davis
County population of 250,000 yields a cost for the transit tax increase of $26.66 per
person per year. (R. at 874-44; 806, EX 7.)
The Clerk testified that Layton City estimated its fluoridation cost to be $4.50 per
person per year (R. at 874-49).

Mathematically, if the Layton estimate applied

countywide, the total cost would be $4.50 times 250,000 people, or $1,125,000. The per
person transit sales tax increase is 5.925 times higher. Yet, the Clerk's self-described
"fiduciary duty to the taxpayers" did not extend to telling them that.
D. Even After The Voters Enacted Fluoridation In The 2000 Election, The
Clerk Continued To Agitate About Costs With An Eye To Influencing A
Revote's Outcome.
Even though the County operates no water systems nor has management
responsibilities for any of the water systems in Davis County, the Clerk testified that in
the early months of 2001, following the approval of fluoridation by the voters, he was
still "following up on [fluoridation] costs, but not researching." (R. at 874-53).
On January 8, 2001, the Clerk sent a letter (R.806, EX 8) to the new Director of
the Health Department, Mr. Lewis Garrett, reiterating the Clerk's concerns about the
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costs offluoridation,providing general cost information from three sources researched by
the Clerk, and requesting an opportunity to "further discuss this information or other
information that we have on file." In his testimony, the Clerk admitted that by January
2001, what he had described as his "fiduciary duty to the voters to provide them with cost
information" was over." (R. at 874-55.)
When asked what authority he had after the 2000 election to continue to be
concerned about fluoridation cost, the Clerk testified:
As Risk Manager for the year, we are heavily involved in trying to
determine how we can alleviate or eliminate potential risk to the County. One of
those risks . . . was related to the potential of cities coming back on the County
because the costs were coming in higher than the Board of Health indicated they
would be, and it relates to potential litigation and potential risk. (R. at 874-56.)
The Clerk testified that he, personally, wanted to see the fluoridation issue revoted
(R. at 874-52). He also testified that on April 10, 2001 he became aware that there were
people in Davis County interested in petitioning for a revote" (R. at 874-52, emphasis
added).
The Clerk testified that on April 13, 2001, he sent a letter to [County]
Commissioner Cragun "informing him of past events and asking for his thoughts on the
controversial issue related to the cost to implement fluoridation." (R. at 874-57.) After
citing some of his research claiming to document high fluoridation costs in other states
and countries, the Clerk "asked the Commission to sanction an independent cost study
before they made a decision to put the question to a vote." (R. at 874-58, emphasis
added.) When asked what statute gave him authority to request such a cost study, the
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Clerk testified, "The one that I mentioned earlier that allows the auditor to check into any
situation he deems necessary." (R. at 874-59). No such statute was ever produced.
Moreover, it is clear from this timeline that as of April 10, 2001, the Clerk anticipated a
revote via a petition process - which he supported - and for which he wanted the County
to finance a cost study to be used in a future fluoridation campaign, as he requested on
April 13, 2001. Because it operates no water systems nor has management authority for
any water systems, the County had no legitimate basis for financing the cost study sought
by the Clerk.
E. In His Eagerness To Get A Revote Of Fluoridation, The Clerk Rushed The
Petition To Certification And The Go-To-Ballot Process For Initiatives
Without Vetting The Petition For Legality. No Vetting Occurred Until After
The Petition Had Been Certified, And Even Then, The Clerk Tried To Change
The Nature Of The Petition To Conform To His Erroneous Interpretation Of
The Law.
The testimony of the Clerk and his two legal advisors with regard to the events
associated with their actions and non-actions as to the petition, together with the
document trail they established, have been cited previously in this brief at pages 17-29.
That narrative shows, based on the unrefuted admissions of the Clerk and his two
counsel, that no vetting of the petition took place until after July 29, 2002. By then, the
petition had been certified under a statute which assured that it would be on the ballot
even if the Commission took no action on it, which is exactly what happened. The
district court's findings that the Clerk sought legal advice at all stages of the petition's
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progress onto the ballot are unsupported and contradicted by the admissions of the Clerk
and his legal advisors.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court denying
Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees should be reversed. Since the Defendants have not
contested the reasonableness of the fee award requested by Plaintiff, this Court should
declare that the Plaintiff has made a sufficient claim for attorneys' fees under the Private
Attorney General Doctrine or the Substantial Benefit Doctrine. If this Court decides in
Plaintiffs favor, Plaintiff also requests that it be awarded its attorneys' fees and costs
incurred with respect to this appeal.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2004.

David R. Irvine
Janet I. Jenson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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